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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores how different modalities, spatialities and scales of power operate in a 
geopolitical context. By tracing the dynamic and shifting economic geographies of state and 
firm power in the events leading up to the collapse of a major Australian firm, Ansett 
Airlines, it reveals the difference that place and position make to the creation and use of 
power. The paper stresses agents’ relational positioning, their ‘places’ in multiple networks of 
association and the ways in which their past actions and visions of the future condition their 
strategic options. The paper contextualises the workings of power and explores how power 
relationships are re-configured in specific contested events. It concludes that power cannot be 
separated from the spatial and temporal dimensions of actual contexts, from actor’s positions 
in contexts, or from their strategic objectives. 
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Introduction 
 
In this paper, the struggles that have reshaped the Australasian aviation sector provide the 
raw material for a critique of John Allen’s (2003) spatialised definition of power as a 
‘relational effect of social interaction’. Based on this critique, the paper constructs an 
alternative spatialised understanding of the workings of power that link power with positions 
and strategies. Because its competitive dimensions are focused on territories and access to 
territories, the aviation sector provides an illuminating case for exploring the spatiality of 
power. In contrast to the way leading firms exert repressive ‘power over’ their suppliers in 
the manufacturing industry (Rutherford and Holmes, 2008), power relations in the aviation 
industry are played out in multiply scaled arenas of intersecting firm, state and inter-state 
                                                 
a E-mail address: sally.weller@vu.edu.au.  
 1
networks. They incorporate complex interdependencies. The paper focuses on the reworking 
of power relations among Singaporean, Australian and New Zealand aviation firms and their 
host states in the 1990s, following the deregulation of Australia’s domestic air services. It 
highlights the deteriorating position and eventual demise of an Australian airline, Ansett 
Airlines.  
How power is defined very much determines its location and spatial expression. This 
paper contributes to the theorisation of power’s spatiality in four ways. First, it associates 
power’s spatiality with agents’ relational positioning or ‘place’ in a constructed world of 
relationships and an evolving history of interactions. Second, it proposes that the impact of 
power is intrinsically related to its timing and infers that power’s spatiality cannot be 
divorced from its temporality. Third, it contends that agents’ dispositions and strategic 
options, and therefore the types of power available to them, are the product of their past 
interactions as expressed in their contemporary spatio-temporal positioning. This positioning 
is dynamic, constructed and requires ongoing maintenance. Fourth, it highlights how specific 
events precipitate reconfigurations of power networks and the positions actors have in them. 
This approach, it is argued, circumvents any need to explain power as somehow traversing 
across space.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section critically 
reviews recent theories of power and sets out this paper’s approach. Its arguments are 
developed via a sustained engagement with John Allen’s (2003) view of power as an 
immanent ‘effect of social interaction’. These ideas are then demonstrated by tracing the 
shifting networks of relations between states and firms in Australasian aviation as they 
restructured after air services were deregulated, privatised and marketised. The penultimate 
section explores the implications of this case study for theories of power. The conclusion 
insists that a spatially attuned understanding of power must incorporate the positions of 
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agents in relation to others and recognise how the histories and trajectories of their 
interactions condition the strategies available, their timing and their subsequent outcomes. 
Spatialising Power 
 
The complexities embedded in the notion of power have produced a massive literature 
spanning numerous disciplines. Their approaches to the location and spatial workings of 
power vary depending on whether power is defined as a capacity held by entities in 
proportion to their resources, is viewed as a mobilisation of resources or is conceived as 
being woven in and through structures (see Lukes, 1986). John Allen’s (2003) Lost 
Geographies of Power is informed by a selection of these texts. This section begins with a 
brief introduction to the literature on power, outlines Allen’s approach and then offers a 
critique of it. 
Three Understandings of Power 
It is useful to begin with what are known as the ‘three faces’ of power (Lukes, 1974). The 
first ‘face’ is found in Dahl’s (1957) behaviourist view, where power involves one agent 
impelling another to do something that he or she would not otherwise have chosen to do. This 
commonplace view is epitomised by the metaphor of power being ‘wielded’ like a weapon. It 
assumes that agents ‘have’ power and that they prevail ‘over’ other (less powerful) agents. 
Power is therefore something that agents own and deploy; a quantifiable, embodied and 
dispositional quality. This power definition underpins critical realism’s view of power as a 
latent capacity that can be held in reserve (Bhaskar, 1975) and infuses realist theories of 
international relations in which ‘strong’ and powerful states uncomplicatedly lord over 
‘weak’ less powerful states (see Guzzini, 1993). Allen (2003) contends that this approach 
imbues power with a mechanical or ‘thing-like’ quality and, consequently, with fixed spatial 
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characteristics. He suggests that in this form, power’s spatiality ‘radiates out’ from its core, 
travels intact across space and operates with predictable effects.  
Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) second face of power adds the possibility that power is 
found in non-action; in the capacity to manoeuvre or manipulate a situation to achieve a 
desired outcome. Exercising this form of power does not necessarily require that agents do 
anything out of the ordinary, although it does demand the ability to maintain the status quo.  
The third face of power incorporates the first two but adds the capacity to modify 
beliefs. In this form, power insinuates itself into social practices, shapes the organisation of 
space and permeates the construction of subjectivities. Power becomes an immanent force 
inseparable from its effects (Foucault, 1970); a force that is at once ‘everywhere’ and 
‘nowhere’. Such power can stifle political dissent if agents embody accepted norms of 
conduct to such a degree that they become incapable of resistance. Whilst sympathetic to this 
view, Allen (2003) is keen to reinvigorate it by reasserting the capacity to rebel. 
Lost Geographies of Power  
A second group of authors understand power as a structuring social context or field of forces. 
Parsons (1957), for example, rejects definitions that locate power ‘in’ entities. Parsons views 
power as a ‘systems resource’, analogous to money, that constitutes the legitimate 
institutionalisation of authority. In a related vein, Hannah Arendt (1958) defines power as a 
collective force that corresponds to the ability to act in concert. In her hands, power is a fluid, 
expandable and emergent force generated by collective action. Allen (2003) is attracted to the 
way this approach views power as a product of spatio-temporal arrangements and as 
involving control over both resources and rules of interaction. But he is critical of its under-
theorisation of power’s spatiality.  
The main concern of Allen’s own theory of power is with how power traverses space; 
that is, with understanding how it ‘plays across the gap between here and there’ (Allen, 2004, 
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p. 25). Allen develops an approach in which power is neither centred nor decentred, but is 
instead a ‘relational effect of social interaction’ that is produced in and through inherently 
spatial social interactions (Allen, 2003, p. 40). Thus defined, power exists only in practice. It 
confers the ability to mobilise resources. From this perspective, resources are not in 
themselves ‘power’ and those in command of resources do not always prevail (Allen, 2003, 
p. 190). Moreover, since power is removed from its embeddedness in entities, it has no 
‘predefined distances’ or ‘simple proximities’; its spatiality is both complex and relational 
(Allen, 2004, p. 19). Power adopts a variety of forms or ‘modalities’ (for example, seduction, 
coercion, manipulation or authority) each of which possesses its own ‘empirical logic’ and 
spatial expression. Each modality’s spatial reach then depends on how its mobilisation 
produces a succession of ‘mediating effects’ in space and time (Allen 2003, p. 97). In actual 
situations, multiple modalities operate together as complex sets of topographical 
‘arrangements’. Consequently, outcomes are not pre-given; they depend on both the modes of 
power in use and the social and physical distance between actors. As different modalities of 
power combine to stretch, shrink or dissolve space, power becomes constitutive of space and 
the spatial becomes imbued with power. In essence then, Allen’s spatialisation shifts the 
concept of power from a dispositional attribute ‘held’ by entities to a quality immanent in its 
multi-faceted forms of expression. This decontextualises and democratises power, restricting 
it to an ‘effective’ moment of interaction that is independent of the resources and the 
capacities of actors.1  
Three aspects of Allen’s spatialisation of power require further explication. First, 
Allen’s definition of power is not exclusive – many phenomena are ‘relational effects of 
social interaction’. If his definition is seen to imply that all social interactions are imbued 
with and express power relations, then some demarcation of power from other aspects of 
social interaction is needed. The extent to which power infiltrates social interactions based on 
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economic exchanges or involving mutually beneficial alliances, for example, would vary 
substantially between instances. Allowing the idea of power to subsume all social interactions 
would blunt its analytical utility; but the manner in which power relations enter into 
‘arrangements’ with other types of social interactions requires further specification. Second, 
it is by no means clear how Allen’s framework incorporates structural forces or abstractions; 
forces that cannot easily be explained as combinations of ‘modalities’ of interaction. Allen’s 
examples focus mainly at the micro-scale, on relations between paired entities, where 
structural forces are not immediately visible. Yet both actors and structures contribute to the 
configurations of power relations, especially in higher-order systems of authority and 
governance, such as those that exist in international institutions (Yeung, 2005, p. 38). Allen’s 
emphasis on social inter-action does not easily accommodate agenda-setting or the 
bureaucratic and diplomatic strategies of non-intervention. Power expressed in non-action 
could not be understood as a ‘relational effect of social interaction’ unless the effects of past 
interactions are somehow stored within existing arrangements, in which case power might 
return to its familiar identity as an individual capacity or held resource. 
The third issue is power’s relationship to cause and effect. Consistent with his critical 
realist understanding of causality, Sayer (2004, p. 260–64) understands Allen’s use of the 
word ‘effect’ in the phrase ‘relational effect of social interaction’ to mean result or outcome. 
He consequently accuses Allen of conflating power with its effects; of defining power 
tautologically as a synonym for its outcomes. Perhaps Allen is more correctly read as 
focusing on the exercise of power; where the word ‘effect’ is used in the sense of a 
mobilisation or causal force, analogous to Giddens’s (1977, p. 384) notion of power as 
transformative capacity.2 Allen’s focus on power’s immediacy has the effect of 
decontextualising power, of separating it from the historical and social contexts in which it is 
embedded. This issue is taken up in the next section. 
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Power, Position and Intentionality  
Although de Certeau’s (1984) view of power is not considered by Allen in Lost Geographies, 
he develops an alternative spatialisation that links place, power and intentionality. De Certeau 
(1984) grounds power in the territorial positioning of actors and in the degree of control they 
exercise over (material or imagined) places. Agents mark out spaces or territories, the 
overlapping configurations of which are the outcome of evolving and path-dependent 
histories of relationships and interactions. Each agent’s place (un lieu propre) conditions the 
repertoire of strategies and tactics available at any time. Place is also the platform from which 
these strategies and tactics are performed. Well-placed actors are able to pursue strategic 
actions that will realise their long-term aims. Less well-placed actors, in contrast, are 
compelled to resort to fragmentary, opportunistic tactical interventions that play out in spaces 
dominated by their adversaries. Thus strategies and tactics make use of space in different 
ways: strategies “are able to produce, tabulate and impose” whereas tactics “can only use, 
manipulate and divert” (De Certeau, 1984, p. 30). The strategic capacities that make it 
possible to define issues, set agendas and change rules are only available to particular 
(powerful) actors. Both tactics and strategies imply movement—stretching and shrinking—of 
relational space as agents’ positions relative to one another change. Power provides relative 
room to move, a degree of freedom that facilitates certain types of action taken at particular 
moments in time, while powerlessness becomes an absence of manoeuvrability, the sense of 
being ‘cornered’ in space and time. 
The relational spaces created by complex, intersecting and fluid networks of 
adversaries can be conceived as arenas of conflict that are constantly redefined as agents 
mobilise and reposition themselves in relation to others. Following Bourdieu (1993) we 
might think of these networks as ‘fields’ of power that include “a set of institutions, including 
practices, understandings and rules; and, a network of organisations” (Lawrence and Phillips, 
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2004, p. 692). Fields, rules, networks and organisations are structures that define agents’ 
places, condition their intentions, constrain their range of feasible strategic and tactical 
moves, and shape subsequent outcomes. The layers of outcomes created by repeated 
interactions become structural constraints to future actions. They tend to selectively reinforce 
and reproduce dominant power relations (see Jessop, 2001). By highlighting both 
intentionality and constraint, De Certeau’s approach enables different weights to be applied 
to agents’ capacities to act. This makes it possible to view intentions as conditioned by both 
specific contextual ‘spatio-temporalities’ and future ‘horizons of action’ (Jessop 2001).  
Massey (2000) reads de Certeau’s ‘dual dichotomisation’ of space-time and strategy-
tactic as over-simplifying complex processes and as immobilising space while according 
transformative capacity to time. Whilst this is a valid point, his central argument—that 
available ‘modalities’ of power are deeply structured by the spatio-temporal positioning of 
agents—provides a strong challenge to theories that separate power from its context.   
Of course, linking different forms of power to position does not resolve the debate 
about what power actually is. But what de Certeau’s work does do is to provide a bridge 
between the aspatial notion of power as a mobilisation at the interface of cause and effect, 
and the fixed location of power when it is understood as an embodied resource. If the spatial 
configuration of the field of engagement defines and creates the various possibilities available 
to each agent, then placing power at the boundaries or limits of action that “shape the field of 
the possible” (Haywood 2000, p. 118) also places power spatially. This is what Low (2005, p. 
86) does when he views power as a “conceptual translation point” located at the interface 
between cause and effect, integrated into the spatio-temporal fabric and reproduced “through 
the active maintenance of certain structural social relations”. Recognising the processes of 
power—as it imbues positioning, strategic intentions, timing, constraints, and outcomes—
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makes it possible to understand power relations without resorting to the idea that power is 
held in reserve or that it is somehow transmitted between ‘here’ and ‘there’.  
Positions and Power in Australasian Aviation  
 
The shifting power relations of Australasian aviation in the 1990s provide an opportunity to 
explore the spatial workings of power in practice. The discussion in this section considers 
three states (Singapore, Australia and New Zealand) and four airlines (Singapore Airlines, 
Qantas, Ansett Airlines and Air New Zealand). Their field of associations included twenty-
one separate but simultaneous dyad relationships (three state-to-state, six firm-to-firm, four 
direct state-to-firm, and eight indirect firm-to-state). The firms involved in this field of 
interactions differed in resources, state patronage, international links and political influence. 
Their relationships with states involved decreasing degrees of overt dependence, whilst their 
relationships with each other exhibited increasing degrees of interdependence. We can think 
of these dependencies and interdependencies in spatial terms, as social distance or proximity. 
Following Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995), firms’ dependencies can also be understood as 
expressing asymmetrical power relationships and as conditioning the types of power—such 
as coercion, bargaining, cooperation or competition—available to them. Thus, their 
‘repertoires’ of strategies and tactics depend on their ‘place’ in an underlying structure of 
associations.  
Stopford and Strange (1991, p. 19) characterise the mesh of simultaneous state-to-
state, firm-to-firm and state-to-firm interactions as ‘triangular diplomacy.’ It is shaped by the 
fundamentally different intentions and objectives of states compared to firms. For states, air 
services present strategic complications. From a security perspective, states are compelled to 
support national services because they guarantee export and import deliveries and provide 
growth-enhancing technological spillovers. From an economic viewpoint, on the other hand, 
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global connectivity and service efficiency may well be optimised by relying on overseas-
based firms. The politics of aviation policy may divide the state. For example, the tourism 
sector might support liberalisations that maximise incoming passenger numbers, even if such 
reforms are at the expense of local airlines. Inter-national services require states to negotiate 
with other states over air service access, but these discussions can never be independent of 
international geo-politics. 
 Airlines are influenced by a potent mix of political and economic concerns. They 
operate within national jurisdictions but provide international services that are governed by a 
plethora of international rules and treaties among states. This reality requires them to 
maintain relationships with states and to take geo-political influences and tensions into 
account. Transnational regulatory structures constrain firms’ activities and force firms to 
cooperate with states to secure market access. The economics of aviation businesses are 
conditioned by the high costs of aircraft and fuel. Airline profitability depends on 
maximising capacity utilisation, streamlining connectivities and efficiently matching service 
capacity to consumer demand. Consequently, firms have an incentive to cooperate (for 
example, through code-sharing arrangements) on low density routes, while competing for 
market share on high density routes. The low marginal cost of carrying additional passengers 
on any flight produces the sector’s propensity for aggressive ticket price discounting. 
Airlines favour organising service delivery in a hub-and-spoke arrangement because it 
reduces costs, consolidates activity and enables aircraft size to be optimally matched to route 
demand (Button, 2002). But hubbing is resisted by the cities, states and airlines 
peripheralised by their relegation to the status of spokes to a dominant hub.  
 In this environment, airlines behave strategically. They routinely employ formal 
strategic planning tools to identify optimal strategies, consistent with their longer range 
plans, and to predict the likely second- and third-order effects of their own and their 
 10
competitors’ strategic moves (Godet, 1991). Competitive strategies may involve building 
mutually beneficial alliances with other firms, states or non-state actors. Airlines’ strategies 
are often predatory (Hinthorne, 1996). Competitive advantage can be secured by seeking to 
alter policy settings or by circumventing regulatory constraints. The industry’s legalistic 
regulatory framework tends to formalise competition in struggles over access to territories, 
routes and destinations.  
 The next sections describe how the 1990s restructuring of the Australasian aviation 
sector realigned states’ and firms’ relational positions and complicated the region’s power 
relations. It traces the interplay between policy reforms brought about by states and changes 
in the ownership and control of aviation firms. The workings of power are illuminated by 
mapping firms’ changing positions in relation to states, markets and other firms. The 
narrative is reconstructed from interviews with former Ansett Airlines employees and with 
expert observers, along with an extensive review of secondary sources. The data obtained 
from former employees included the responses to open questions in a mail survey of post-
retrenchment outcomes conducted a year after Ansett’s closure. It invited the 600 
respondents to append additional information about the circumstances of the collapse. This 
generated about fifty responses and included some detailed accounts by former managers. A 
selection of twenty survey respondents participated in depth interviews which, inter alia, 
discussed the events leading up to the collapse and workers’ responses to them. Additional 
information was collected in later telephone follow-up surveys. A separate, internet-based 
survey of former Ansett employees who had found employment with overseas airlines, 
especially in Asia, also produced insights about the configurations of airlines in the region 
(see Weller, 2004; 2008; 2009, forthcoming). Whilst retrospective construction of events 
risks imposing an unwarranted degree of coherence on what could be interpreted as a series 
of unrelated occurrences, this historical overview enables power to be ‘placed’ in context; in 
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relation to the sequential unfolding of historically embedded social practice. The narrative 
highlights Ansett Airlines’ progressive loss of place in firm and state networks after the 
aviation industry made its transition from state-centred to market-led regulation. These 
changes are presented in three phases: first the ensemble of states and firms before 
deregulation; second, their reconfigurations soon after deregulation; and third, the formation 
of global alliances among firms and the realignments that culminated in the demise of Ansett 
Airlines. 
An ‘Ensemble of States’ 
 
Singapore, Australia and New Zealand share many social, legal and business traditions 
through their common membership of the British Commonwealth. However, under post-
WWII nation-building policies, each state acted in the international realm as an autonomous 
entity; that is, as a quasi-individual oriented to internal concerns.3 Each of the three territories 
established a wholly-owned national flagship airline―Singapore’s Singapore Airlines (SIA), 
New Zealand’s Air New Zealand (Air NZ) and Australia’s Qantas―which operated as public 
services and were essential components of each state’s infrastructure (Kangis and O’Reilly, 
2003).  Airlines were markers of nationhood (Ragamuran, 1997) that reinforced the state’s 
‘infrastructural’ power (Mann, 1986). 
International air services were coordinated under a negotiated regulatory framework 
designed to respect national territorial jurisdictions. As early as 1919, the Paris Convention 
established each state’s complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory (Abeyratne, 1993). The 1940 Chicago Conference later reinforced this framework by 
codifying the rights and responsibilities of air service providers into a set of rules known as 
the Freedoms of the Air (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Freedoms of the Air 
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First Freedom  To fly across a nation’s territory without landing; 
Second Freedom To land in a nation’s territory for non-traffic purposes; 
Third Freedom  To put down, in the territory of the first State, traffic coming 
from the home State of the carrier; 
Fourth Freedom  To take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic destined for 
the home State of the carrier; 
Fifth Freedom  To take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic coming 
from or destined to a third State. 
____________ _________________________________________________ 
Sixth Freedom To transport, via the home State of the carrier, traffic moving 
between two other States; 
Seventh Freedom To transport traffic between the territory of the granting State 
and any third State with no requirement to include on such 
operation any point in the territory of the recipient State; 
Eighth Freedom To transport cabotage traffic between two points in the 
territory of the granting State on a service which originates or 
terminates in the home country of the foreign carrier or outside 
the territory of the granting State; 
Ninth Freedom To transport cabotage traffic of the granting State on a service 
performed entirely within the territory of the granting State. 
 
Source: Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport (Doc 9626, Part 4) at 
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/trivia/freedoms_air.htm (last accessed July 2007). 
 
After the 1946 Bermuda Agreement (between the United States and United 
Kingdom), the Freedoms were operationalised globally in multiple reciprocal bilateral 
agreements between states (and backed by detailed Memoranda of Understanding). Only the 
first five of the Freedoms listed in Table 1 are recognised by international treaties. They are 
incorporated in most bilateral Air Service Agreements.  
This regulatory framework produced an ‘ensemble’ arrangement controlled by states 
and designed to repel encroachments on national territories (see Agnew, 1999). The 
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international web of regulation constrained the activities of airlines (Kasper, 1988). Figure 1 
depicts the aviation industry structure produced by this Westphalian system as comprising 
three rigidly separated national air services in which states exercised direct authority over 
their owned airlines. States could influence each other through the persuasive means of 
diplomacy, but had little direct influence over other states’ airlines. Inter-airline competition, 
when it existed, was intertwined with national interests and played out through negotiations 
about access (as framed by the agenda-setting parameters of the Freedoms). In 1979, for 
example, Qantas and British Airways attempted to force Asian carriers off the lucrative 
Australia–London (Kangaroo) route by convincing the Australian and British governments to 
limit the ‘sixth freedom’ rights of Asian carriers (Conybeare, 1987).  
 
Singapore
Singapore 
Airlines
Qantas
Australia
Air New Zealand
New Zealand
TransAustralia
Airlines (TAA)
Ansett
Airlines
Equity Link - Coercive Authority
Regulatory Control
Diplomatic Influence
Freedoms of the Air
 
Figure 1: Ensemble States 
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 An additional feature of this regulatory structure was the rigid separation of domestic 
and international services. Australia’s domestic market was served by a state-subsidised and 
controlled ‘Two Airline’ duopoly comprising a state-owned airline, Trans Australia Airways 
(TAA), and a private quasi-competitor, Ansett Airlines. Their matching services on 
designated trunk routes were provided within a tight framework of non-negotiable regulatory 
controls. Within this structure, however, Ansett Airlines operated profitably as the 
centrepiece of a diversified portfolio of travel and tourism businesses that were based on its 
protected position in air service delivery. In de Certeau’s (1984) terms, Ansett’s business 
model was based on tactical exploitation of the regulated industry structure. 
De-regulation and New Relationships  
 
In the 1980s, governments came to view globalisation and market competition as a 
precondition to sustainable long-term national competitiveness. Competitive markets were 
seen to make airline services more efficient and more responsive to market signals, which in 
turn would reduce the costs of trade, facilitate the expansion of export industries and promote 
aggregate welfare. The regulatory frameworks and state patronage that had previously 
underpinned the aviation sector were recast as ‘non-tariff barriers’ that inhibited the 
expansion of international trade (Findlay et al., 1997).  
Singapore, Australia and New Zealand each began the process of separating airlines 
from direct state control in the mid 1980s. Singapore and New Zealand embraced the virtues 
of competitive markets earlier than Australia. Singapore Airlines was listed on the Singapore 
Stock Exchange in 1985, although the Singapore government retained effective control via 
Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd. In Air New Zealand’s 1989 privatisation, the government 
retained a local ownership requirement but relinquished control to New Zealand investment 
firm Brierley Investments, which took a 65% share in the national carrier. Both SIA (25%) 
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and Qantas (19%) purchased large enough shares to ensure that Air NZ’s decisions would not 
be detrimental to their interests. 
 In Australia, the reform process was slow. After a series of reports highlighting the 
high costs of air travel (Forsyth and Hocking, 1985) and a major inquiry in 1986 (May et al., 
1986), the Government resolved to deregulate the domestic market, to privatise Qantas and to 
open Australia’s international aviation markets to competition. It nonetheless set conditions 
on Qantas’s sale that would guarantee continuing national control: no more than 49% of the 
carrier would be sold to institutional buyers, no more than 35% to overseas buyers and no 
more than 25% to any single buyer.  
Airlines prepared for impending deregulation by shifting their competitive strategies. 
Australia’s only private national airline, Ansett Airlines, shored up its competitive position by 
purchasing numerous small regional airlines and incorporating them into its network. In 1986 
it also extended into New Zealand by purchasing a regional service and re-launching it as 
Ansett NZ. The Ansett Group also began divesting non-core businesses and accelerated 
internal efficiency-oriented restructuring. In 1989, Australia’s impending regulatory changes 
(or, more exactly, airlines’ cost-containment strategies in anticipation of the changes) 
triggered Australia’s national pilot’s strike. Its eventual defeat enabled Australian airlines to 
restructure their employment practices in preparation for a more competitive environment.  
As planned, Australia’s ‘Two Airline’ domestic regulatory structure was dismantled 
in 1990. Regulations establishing a competitive framework were then phased in to induce the 
two domestic carriers, Ansett and TAA, to operate competitively. Additional reforms 
announced in February 1992 allowed Qantas to fly on domestic routes (creating the 
possibility of it becoming a third domestic airline), enabled domestic airlines to fly on 
international routes and commenced negotiations toward an ‘Open Skies’ agreement with 
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New Zealand that would establish a single trans-Tasman aviation market. These 
liberalisations aimed to construct a competitive Australasian market.  
In theory, TAA and Ansett Airlines would become true competitors after 
deregulation. In practice, however, they joined forces in a price war that crushed the market’s 
new entrants Compass Airlines I and II (Wilson, 2002). Meanwhile, Qantas maintained its 
focus on international services. As a consequence, a de-facto two airline arrangement 
continued to operate, but with the two main players (TAA and Ansett) specialising their 
services and destinations in an effort to establish quasi-monopolistic control over niche 
market segments. Ansett Airlines, with its regional interests in Australia and New Zealand, 
was well placed to prosper in an opening Australasian market (Kissling, 1998).  
In September 1992, the Australian government moved to break the continuing 
domestic duopoly by selling the state-owned domestic carrier TAA (now renamed Australian 
Airlines) to the state-owned international carrier Qantas. The AUD$400 million sale provided 
Qantas with a domestic customer base to ‘feed’ its international services. Because the merger 
would enable Qantas to compete in a deregulated international market, it also made Qantas 
more attractive to prospective investors. Soon after, Qantas was partially privatised. After 
considering numerous offers, the Government elected to sell a 25% interest to British 
Airways (BA). This link would strengthen Qantas’s global position by giving it access to 
BA’s superior resources and technologies.4 However, commentators saw the move as 
subordinating Qantas to BA, as repositioning it as the ‘Asia Pacific piece’ in British Airways’ 
‘global jigsaw’ (AFR 1993, p. 35) and as a bit-part player in British Airways’ ‘grand 
strategy’ of global service reach (Richardson, 1992).  
The state-orchestrated re-positioning of Qantas altered power relations among the 
region’s other air service firms. If air traffic between Australia and Europe used Hong Kong 
rather than Singapore for refuelling, as was likely in a Qantas–BA alliance, they would 
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directly threaten SIA’s regional position (AFR 1993, p. 35). Such a reconfiguration would 
have also directly challenged Singapore’s development strategy, which sought to position the 
island as a key node in globalising flows (Castells, 1988) and which was predicated on 
Singapore’s positioning as the region’s primary air service hub (Bowen, 2000; Ragamuran, 
1986). Already, Singapore Airlines’ growth during the 1980s had been based around ‘sixth 
freedom’ travel to and from Australia (Hanlon, 1999).  
Qantas’s enlarged resources, state patronage and capacity to offer direct international 
connections also threatened the positions of the two smaller Australasian players, Ansett 
Airlines and Air New Zealand. As a defensive tactic, both sought to extend their international 
operations and to enter code-sharing arrangements with airlines beyond the region.  
Ansett Airlines became especially vulnerable. In the recession years 1990–91, when it 
made a loss of AUD$50 million, Ansett was already carrying a debt of AUD$2.5 billion. It 
needed an AUD$200 million capital injection – an amount that neither of its diversified (and 
not aviation specialised) owner firms, TNT and News Ltd, was in a position to provide. 
Instead, both Ansett’s joint owners were considering selling their aviation interests. By the 
mid 1990s industry analysts had formed the view that a deregulated Australasian market 
could support only two competitive carriers – and that these would be Qantas and Air New 
Zealand.  
However, while firms’ strategies were oriented to securing a place in the new 
Australasian market, negotiations between the Australian and New Zealand governments 
over the market’s establishment had stalled amid anxieties about its implications for tourist 
inflows and the competitive positions of airlines. Smaller regional airlines had cause to resist 
unfettered ‘Open Skies’ liberalisations because open aviation markets favour larger carriers 
with higher volumes of domestic feeder traffic.5  
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In October 1996, the region’s geometries of power (Massey, 1993) shifted 
dramatically when Air New Zealand purchased a 50% share in Ansett Airlines. The purchase 
gave Air NZ access to the Australian domestic market and to Ansett’s extensive regional 
feeder network without having to rely on the planned single aviation market (Kissling, 1998). 
The purchase tilted the region’s inter-firm balance of power by bringing Ansett into a 
network of equity linked firms that were the global competitors of Qantas and British 
Airways. An united and globally connected Air NZ–Ansett alliance could create strong 
competition for Qantas. In response to Air NZ’s action, Qantas sold its share in Air NZ in 
March 1997. The resulting reconfiguration is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 After De-Regulation 
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Whether intentionally or not, the effect of the conditions placed on the Ansett sale by 
national regulators favoured national flagship airlines. National competition regulators on 
both sides of the Tasman demanded ownership changes to satisfy competition and foreign 
ownership laws. The New Zealand Commerce Commission determined that Ansett’s New 
Zealand subsidiary, Ansett New Zealand, would have to be sold. It later became Qantas NZ. 
Meanwhile, the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board required that 51% of Ansett’s 
fledgling international business, Ansett International, would also have to be sold. These 
rulings resulted in Ansett’s international operations being dismantled, which meant that 
Ansett would be restricted to the finite and crowded local market, where there was little scope 
for profit-taking. It also meant that Air NZ would be the Air NZ–Ansett alliance’s sole 
international carrier. These regulatory interventions reinforced Ansett’s already 
disadvantaged international position: unlike Qantas and Air NZ, Ansett had never been one of 
the designated national carriers favoured in bilateral air agreements. 
Inter-firm Alliances and the Demise of Ansett Airlines 
Governments’ continued intervention in both airline ownership and in setting the territorial 
boundaries of markets encouraged airlines to focus on alliances, code-sharing arrangements 
and other cooperative efficiencies (for example, sharing outsourced maintenance and 
provisioning services) to expand their service reach. Singapore Airlines, Air New Zealand 
and Ansett Airlines formalised their links by becoming members of the Star Alliance in 1998. 
It linked their services with the United States’ United Airlines and Thai Airways, among 
others. Meanwhile, Qantas and British Airways, which were already linked through British 
Airways’ share in Qantas, had become part of the competing oneworld alliance, and through 
it, had become allies of American Airlines and Cathay Pacific. Code-sharing among alliance 
partners improved efficiency and connectivity, and made it possible for firms to create 
‘seamless’ services without relying on their host states’ capacity to negotiate access. 
 20
These new configurations clarified a competitive division between two near-global 
aviation networks. They created, for networked firms, quasi-monopolistic markets based on 
inter-firm flows of loyal passengers. They effectively extended market access throughout the 
network without directly confronting the constraints of the bilateral agreements between 
states. They extended airlines’ spatial reach and enabled them non-exclusive access to each 
other’s domestic markets without the need to enter into equity-based partnerships. They also 
encouraged firms to frame their interests in global rather than national or regional terms. 
The competitive context encouraged service rationalisation and therefore stimulated 
further shifts in airline ownership. SIA and Qantas each considered increasing their stake in 
Air NZ, but their plans were frustrated by the New Zealand Government’s 25% cap on 
foreign ownership. After Australia further deregulated ownership rules to allow domestic 
airlines (i.e Ansett Airlines) to be 100% foreign owned, SIA and Air NZ each considered 
buying the remaining 50% share of Ansett Airlines. SIA made a friendly offer for the 
remaining 50% of Ansett Airlines in March 1999. This purchase would have given SIA direct 
access to the Australian market independent of its links with Air NZ. In the same year, it 
purchased a 49% share in Virgin Atlantic. 
However, under an agreement made when it purchased the first 50% share of Ansett, 
Air NZ held the right to purchase the second 50% share. This meant that SIA could not buy 
into Ansett without Air NZ’s permission. In the ensuing struggle, Air NZ’s largest 
shareholder, Brierley Investments, manoeuvred to force SIA to purchase Ansett through Air 
NZ. The seller (News Ltd) subsequently withdrew and the deal collapsed. In February 2000, 
then, Air NZ exercised its pre-emptive right and purchased the second 50% share of Ansett. 
Given that Ansett was a larger airline than Air NZ (in terms of financial resources, aircraft 
and personnel) this outcome produced considerable disquiet among Ansett employees.  
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Air NZ then began the process of subsuming Ansett Airlines. It flexed its authority 
over its subsidiary by embarking on a rationalisation program that involved jettisoning 
Ansett’s senior management, incorporating Ansett’s management functions into Air NZ’s 
Auckland head office and reorganising the Ansett business model. The Ansett workforce 
resisted these changes and relations between Ansett and Air NZ deteriorated quickly. On one 
side, Ansett’s woes were attributed to the ‘inflexibility’ of Ansett’s organisational structure 
and to the high wages enjoyed by its unionised workforce. On the other side, Air NZ was 
accused of milking Ansett’s profits, of failing to keep up with maintenance, of failing to 
invest in new technologies and of wasting resources on ill-advised organisational changes 
(see Easdown and Wilms, 2002; Painter, 2001). When the Australia–New Zealand common 
aviation market was eventually finalised in November 2000 (NZMFAT, 2000), restrictions 
on Air NZ’s access to the Australian market were removed. Ansett’s brand reputation then 
became its only strategically significant asset. 
However, the entry of Virgin Blue into the Australian market in August 2000 
disrupted Air NZ’s strategy. With a low-cost business model, backing from the Virgin group 
and support from the state government in its base city of Brisbane, Virgin made an immediate 
impression on the already-overcrowded local market.6 Despite restructuring to reduce its 
operating costs, Ansett Airlines’ full-service delivery model could not compete. In the 
ensuing price war, Ansett lost market share and was soon losing AUD$2.4 million a day 
(Easdown and Wilms, 2002, p. 111). Air NZ sought to halt Virgin’s encroachment by 
offering to buy it out, but Virgin was not for sale. Air NZ’s share price plummeted, which in 
turn pushed it to an unacceptably high debt-to-equity ratio. According to Easdown and Wilms 
(2002, p. 112), the New Zealand government ignored capital-for-equity offers by SIA and 
Qantas. Qantas moved to replace SIA as Air NZ’s key investor.7  Instead, Air NZ offered 
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Ansett (including its assets and liabilities) to Qantas for the token amount of one Australian 
dollar.   
When Air New Zealand announced Ansett’s closure on the 12th of September 2001, 
the Australian Government elected not to intervene and Ansett’s affairs were put under the 
control of a bankruptcy Administrator. A buyer able to inject sufficient capital to revitalise 
Ansett could not be found, and the airline folded some five months later.8  Air NZ’s failure to 
pay Ansett workers’ their outstanding entitlements soured relations between Australia and 
New Zealand. The configuration of services at the conclusion of this saga is summarised in 
Figure 3. Within this overall framework, under open skies agreements airlines enjoyed much 
greater access to national ports. 
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In the aftermath, Virgin Blue replaced Ansett as Australia’s second airline. Qantas 
gained control of Ansett’s feeder regional air services and reasserted its dominance over 
Australia’s international air service linkages (Weller, 2007). In February 2002, the New 
Zealand government was forced to inject NZ$885 million into Air NZ in a loan and equity 
investment that resulted in it holding a 82% ownership share (Air New Zealand, 2006). A 
leading aviation commentator described this intervention as “putting the privatisation genie 
back in the bottle” (Harbison, 2001:1).  
Subsequently, Qantas and Air NZ planned to form a strategic alliance. However, 
decisions by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the New 
Zealand Commerce Commission, in September 2003 and October 2003 respectively, rejected 
this option on the grounds that it would render the Australasian market uncompetitive. These 
rulings, which ignored the firms’ strategising for control of the key Australia-London link in 
a global marketplace, reinforced Qantas’s and Air NZ’s national carrier status and had the 
effect of ‘locking in’ the inter-firm structure shown in Figure 3. The Australian government 
has continued to deny Singapore Airlines access to operate services between Australia and 
the United States. Despite BA selling its share in Qantas in September 2004, the two airlines 
continue to cooperate as alliance partners. Qantas and SIA have both established low cost 
subsidiaries (Jetstar and Tiger Airways respectively) to compete with Virgin Blue in local 
tourist markets. 
Throughout these reconfigurations, firms’ strategies were complicated by state 
political interests. Before Ansett’s demise, Ansett employees’ preferred outcome – and 
probably the most logical outcome at the time – was that Ansett be purchased by Singapore 
Airlines. Air NZ’s and Qantas’s efforts to block this outcome are best understood in the 
context of the impact the impending Australia–New Zealand common aviation market would 
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have on feeder traffic in the crucial Australia–London corridor. When the trans-Tasman 
market came into force, ownership of Ansett Airlines would have given SIA unrestricted 
access to the Australian and New Zealand markets. Qantas’ interests would have been 
undermined, since the purchase would have redirected Ansett’s regional feeder traffic to 
SIA’s international network. Singapore Airlines would then have had no need to cooperate 
(and would very likely have switched to competing) with its alliance partner, Air New 
Zealand.  Therefore, the viability of New Zealand’s national carrier would also have been 
compromised. Qantas pressured the Australian government in an effort to frustrate any 
Ansett–Singapore link. 
Relational Geographies of Power 
 
The failure of Ansett Airlines was the culmination of a path-dependant sequence of shifting 
power relationships between airlines and states and among competing airlines. In retrospect, 
we can see that as Ansett Airlines became more dependent on other firms, it progressively 
lost its capacity for autonomous strategising and ultimately became a pawn in the strategies 
of other firms. Whilst not wishing to overstate the link of strategies to place and tactics to 
lack of place, there is value in thinking of Ansett’s deteriorating position after deregulation as 
‘displacement’ and of its actions after deregulation as survival tactics rather than viable long-
term strategies. Conversely, when other airlines used alliances and equity shares to expand 
their territorial reach, they did so without risking or relinquishing their existing ‘place’ in 
territorialised relationships. Throughout, the changing relationships among states and firms 
were expressed in territorial terms. 
In this history, changes in the region’s regulatory structure stimulated 
reconfigurations of relations among firms and therefore in the trajectories of the aviation 
sectors’ geometries of power. However, while states deregulated and privatised their aviation 
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services, national competition and foreign investment regulations continued to limit capital 
movements and bilateral agreements made within the Freedoms of the Air framework 
continued to impose territorial limits on aviation markets. In practice, therefore, national 
regulations maintained national markets that were favourable to former national flagship 
airlines (see also Button, 2003). Ansett Airlines’ demise was in part a product of its unique 
status as the only major airline in this story that did not attract state patronage. Paradoxically, 
then, the airline most disadvantaged by deregulation was the region’s only continuously 
privately owned airline. It appears therefore that the Australasian experience is an exception 
to Leinbach and Bowen’s (2004, p. 296) conclusion that aviation privatisation and 
liberalisation “shift[ed] the balance of power to shape airline networks and patterns of 
accessibility from national governments to the industry's leading airlines.” In this case, states 
continued to underwrite their respective national airlines’ competitive positions. And this, 
arguably, reflects the positions of these states at the extremities of the world’s air service 
networks.   
Nonetheless, the liberalisation process reconstructed the region as a market and 
redefined the aviation industry’s position in state economies. In contrast to its former status 
as national infrastructure, aviation was redefined as a service industry with the role of linking 
world cities, delivering transaction cost efficiencies and accelerating commodities trade. 
States distanced themselves from direct control of airlines and in effect shifted the airlines 
from the trade-protected to the trade-exposed sectors of their economies. This discursive 
repositioning was crucial in altering the context in which the region’s aviation power 
relations were produced and reproduced. Flyvbjerg (1998) argues that powerful actors are 
those able to define the reality in which power relations are played out. But here, no 
particular ‘powerful actor’ was orchestrating the definitional shift. Rather, the aviation 
sector’s position changed because states and firms collectively agreed that it should. Airline 
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firms wanted liberalisation because the bilateral Freedoms of Air framework had become an 
impediment to multi-destination route and capacity planning in interconnected networks. 
States wanted liberalisation to eliminate the cost burden of supporting airlines and to unleash 
competition that would reduce air transport costs. Nonetheless, since the region’s airlines 
were small in global terms and consequently unlikely to withstand open competition, they 
also sought protection for their market territories. As a result, flagship airlines remained 
closely aligned to their parent states. 
What then does the demise of Ansett Airlines say about the whereabouts of power? 
This shifting set of relationships was characterised by purposeful strategies of firms and 
states. The outcome, Ansett’s disempowerment and displacement, was not the specific 
intention of any single agent, but the result of deliberate actions among a complicated field of 
adversaries. The result can be understood only by taking into account the trajectories of these 
relationships and considering how actions produced a variety of anticipated and unanticipated 
second- and third-order repercussions. Ansett’s strategies in preparation for deregulation 
appeared rational, but the possibilities available to it were constrained by the structure of the 
relationships in which it was embedded. In a large part, its disempowerment was an 
incidental effect of the struggle between SIA and Qantas for control of global connectivities. 
In these struggles, each firm’s choices were conditioned by its position in networks of 
relationships. However, the outcomes may well have been different. For example, without the 
manoeuvring of Brierley Investments, Ansett Airlines could have come under the control of 
SIA and flourished within the Star Alliance. In other words, to understand the workings of 
power and its outcomes requires consideration of an entire field of interactions, as they 
evolve in time, and not only direct interactions within immediate arrangements of forces. 
For both firms and states, intentions were continually adjusted to account for what we 
might call the ‘possibility boundaries’ of their positions and the self-imposed limitations 
 27
produced by their ‘horizons of action’. In retrospect, for example, Ansett’s pre-deregulation 
objective of expanding into the planned trans-Tasman market (at Air NZ’s expense) seems 
parochial. Its narrow horizon not did take sufficient heed of the threat it would pose for SIA 
and Qantas, and their struggle over international traffic. Virgin Blue entered the Australian 
market at an opportune time, when Ansett and Air NZ were pre-occupied with their own 
struggles. However, even if Ansett and Air NZ had been more alert to the threat that Virgin 
posed, their options were circumscribed by the organisational structures and market positions 
their histories had created.  
Regardless of whether attempts to carve out new positions relied on competitively 
dislodging competitors or cooperatively building network alliances with them, strategies were 
conditioned by the uneven distribution of territorialised resources. State-maintained authority 
over territorialised markets, via the Freedoms of the Air, was the crucial factor in whether or 
not firms could realise their strategic intentions and whether or not they were able to defend 
their existing positions. The fact that Ansett had no state-sanctioned ‘place’ was therefore 
significant to its demise. Resource differences continue to be important to the operation of 
power because they condition strategic intentions, shape the choice of means by which agents 
act and, in large part, determine how others respond.   
This narrative also highlights the link between the timing of actions, the types of 
power deployed and the nature of outcomes. Incremental and non-confrontation changes in 
relationships within a dominant structural arrangement tended to reinforce existing power 
relations. Government rulings on airline ownership, for example, generally favoured existing 
relationships. Other actions or inactions, such as Air NZ’s purchase of Ansett Airlines or the 
Australian Government’s decision not to help revive the failing Ansett, precipitated major 
realignments of multiple relationships.  
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Thinking of power as an immanent ‘relational effect of social interaction’ cannot 
explain these variations in the significance of different exercises of power. This illuminates 
two principal limitations of Allen’s (2003) displacement of power from entities: his 
theoretical inability to accord different weights to agent’s capacities and the exclusion of the 
relationship between the selection of instruments (modalities) and the contexts in which they 
are exercised.  Together, these observations suggest the need for a more process-oriented and 
strategic view of power; a view sensitive to the timing of key events and the tipping points 
that reconfigure relational trajectories in fields of relationships. In summary, power cannot be 
separated from the spatial and temporal dimensions of actual contexts, from agent’s positions 
in contexts, or from their strategic objectives. In a strategic view, power involves defining the 
context as well as acting in it. It involves reading a situation, knowing how and when to 
deploy which strategies, and anticipating their likely direct and indirect impacts. Power is 
therefore a function of social and spatial position, experience and intellect, as well as physical 
resources. Power may exist in instantiated moments, but it is always an expression of the 
relational geometries in which it is embedded.   
Conclusion 
 
This paper has used the shifting power relations in airline networks to argue that a spatialised 
understanding of power must take into account resources, capacities positioning and 
strategies. This example illuminates two neglected aspects of power. First, there were 
undoubtedly ‘powerful actors’ in this story. Their secure place enabled them to define 
situations and to maintain relatively stable power relations across multiple domains. This not 
only reduced the likelihood of unexpected events occurring, but also produced space; a 
greater capacity to choose the timing of their strategic plays or to use stalling tactics to further 
their strategic interests. They were more able to turn complex situations to their advantage 
(or, at least, to limit the negative consequences). Second, however, the power of powerful 
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actors was not ‘held’ in reserve, but was a fluid consequence of their spatio-temporal 
position. Networks of association and histories of interaction are both central to the spatial 
workings of power.  
To conclude, power is not equivalent to strategy, nor is it another word for the 
boundary between cause and effect. It is a spatialised form of agency, but not one that is 
confined to the immediacy of particular modalities and their arrangements. Power is found in 
relational positioning, expresses resource endowments, shapes intentions, defines strategic 
horizons and conditions the range of possible outcomes. Through these processes, the 
spatiality of power can be comprehended without resorting to metaphors of flow or 
translation or the idea that power somehow moves from A to B. 
Acknowledgements 
 
The research on which this article is based was conducted with the support of the Australian 
Research Council, Discovery Project DP0558085. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented in sessions on Geographies of Power in the 2006 RGS-IBS Conference.  
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Contrast, for example, Clegg’s (1989, p. 32) definition, in which power is “a produced and reproduced effect 
which is contingent upon the strategic competencies and skills of actors who would be powerful”. 
2 In this author’s reading, Allen (2003) slips between ‘effects’ as catalyst and as outcomes. The word ‘effect’ 
can also be read as the essence or central meaning of a social interaction (“words to the effect that”), as an 
illusion, outward appearance or artifice (something done “for effect”), as a dispositional quality (“the law took 
effect …”) or as a possession (“personal effects”).  
3 Singapore is the exception. After WWII, it was made a British Crown Colony in 1946, achieved self-
government in 1959 and independence in 1965. 
4 The remaining 75% of Qantas was sold in a public float in 1995.  
5  Since aviation markets are finite, strategic trade theory predicts that open competition is a zero-sum game that 
will deliver benefits to resource-rich firms (see Elek et al.1999; Oum, 1998). 
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6  Other contingencies undermining airline profits included rural stagnation, inter-modal competition from rail 
and road transport, the abandonment of regional development incentives, increasing fuel prices, and an 
appreciating Australian dollar.   
7  This would mean buying back the share of Air NZ that it had sold in 1997. Easdown and Wilms (2002, p. 
127) cite a letter to New Zealand Finance Minister Michael Cullen, dated 25 June 2001 (before Ansett’s fall) in 
which Qantas CEO Geoff Dixon states: “As you know from our various meetings and telephone conversations, 
our aim would be to replace Singapore Airlines as the cornerstone investor in Air New Zealand”. 
8  Under Australian law, Administrators appointed to manage bankrupt firms are encouraged to assist firms to 
trade out of difficulty.  
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